The Business Threat from the Low End
Many of you remember Digital Equipment, the vendor that dominated computing in the 1970s and 1980s. What did Digital do wrong that sent its business into a downward spiral? The conventional contradictory answers are Digital had too much of an engineering culture and not a marketing culture; or too much of a marketing culture that did not appreciate the innovation the company spawned. Or, its management became too short-term profit-focused. or was too focused on long-term technology waves.
However, what if Digital did the right things — everything a perfectly functioning market leader should have done to stay on top?
That’s the view of Clayton Christensen, Harvard professor and author of The Innovator’s Dilemma and The Innovator’s Solution, who said Digital – and many companies like it – was usurped by disruptive technology forces beyond its control. He speculates that Digital, in fact, did everything it was supposed to do to ensure the viability of the company to maintain leadership in high-margin markets.
This summer, I had the opportunity to attend the World Innovation Forum in New York, in which luminaries and contrarians such as Christensen talked about the new forces that are reshaping the technology market.
The paradox many technology vendors have faced over the years of change is that when new commodity technologies emerge, they typically do not pose a threat, and are targeted at the marginal low-end space. As adoption grows from the low end up, the market leaders are even glad to get out of low-margin businesses and keep chasing the high-value opportunities. The executives at the market-leading vendors are actually not being shortsighted or making the “wrong decisions.” Rather, they are actually making very astute judgments to keep investing their resources in higher-paying customers. However, this high-margin segment keeps shrinking as the commodity solution takes hold, even among large customers. Thus begins a gradual death spiral, as the market leader is continually forced upstream and out of the mainstream.
It reminds me of that old maxim I once heard earlier in my career: “Sell to the classes, eat with the masses. Sell to the masses, eat with the classes.” Microsoft – disruptor extraordinaire – certainly seemed to know this rule.
We see this happening in computing every day. Unix, for example, emerged in the 1980s, and began to eat into the low-end space, forcing mainframe and midrange systems upstream. Later, Windows started to do the same to Unix. Now, Linux is forcing Windows upstream. Possibly, the rise of on-demand or Software as a Service may begin to even force Linux and on-site open-source applications upstream – we will see.
Technology disruption doesn’t just happen in the IT industry, of course. Christensen pointed out that such developments completed turned the steel industry on its head in the 1970s and 1980s. Large steel producers gave up the low-end rebar market, for example, to the mini-mills, a pattern that eventually moved up to angle iron, then to structural steel, and more lately to sheet steel.
Christensen points out that disruptors don’t start off going after the customers of the big established companies — rather, they serve customers who may have never had access to such products. There are some classic examples of this in the IT industry, of course. Microsoft and its resellers sold computers to individuals and departments that never had access to the mainframe glass house. The Internet emerged serving those individuals that didn’t have access to premium online services.
Now, we have applications such as ERP being provided through new delivery channels to companies that previously could not afford Big Software. Salesforce.com, for example, sells to small to mid-sized companies that never could afford full-fledged ERP solutions. MySQL provides a robust relational database to those who could not afford Oracle or DB2 licensing and infrastructure. Open source solutions such as SugarCRM are also playing to this market. And – important to remember – this is how Microsoft started out and continues to position itself.
IBM’s mainframe strategy over the past few years has been interesting – and an example of how to turn the tide against disruptive technologies. Obviously, as mentioned, Big Iron was chased far upstream by commodity priced solutions. However, IBM has been working to dramatically lower the price of its mainframe boxes in response to this trend. This all began during IBM’s dark days in the 1990s, when it cut the price of a unit of mainframe processing from $63,000 to less than $2,500 seven years later. In essence, IBM disrupted itself, undercutting its own business with products targeted at underserved markets.
There are a number of disruptive forces converging these days that promise to bring new tools, intelligence, and processing power formally out of the reach of many organizations. Service-Oriented Architecture, Software as a Service, open source, and grid computing all have something in common: they are driving the industry to highly modular, building-block, assemble-to-order approaches around software.
Modular architectures will always win out over larger, integrated architectures, Christensen said. Whereas 20 to 30 years ago IBM dominated its markets with all-in-one solutions – from hardware to operating system to database to application to sales and service – the vendors that focus on one of these areas now claim this space.
What is the greatest competitor to a market-leading company? Not the number-two company, Christensen says. Rather, it’s non-consumption. Again, there is always a segment that lies outside of the market that doesn’t have access to the tools or software or applications offered by the market leaders. That’s where new ways of computing begin to take root and move up the food chain.